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Abstract:  We investigate the use of photon number states to identify eavesdropping 
attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes.  The technique is based on the fact 
that different photon numbers traverse a channel with different transmittivity.  We then 
describe two QKD schemes that utilize this method, one of which overcomes the upper 
limit on the key generation rate imposed by the dead time of detectors when using a 
heralded source of photons. 
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1. Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of generating a secret key between two 
parties (Alice, the sender, and Bob, the receiver) that is provably secure assuming that the 
laws of quantum physics are correct and that any eavesdropper (Eve) must work within 
the framework of these laws.  Introduced in 1984, the BB84 protocol for QKD is based 
on the use of single photons for encoding the quantum information [1].  The uncertainty 
principle guarantees the security of the protocol since Eve does not have any a priori 
information about the basis that Alice used for encoding the information, ensuring the 
impossibility of a precise measurement of the secure bit due to the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle.  Sometimes the security is formulated in terms of the no-cloning 
theorem by Wooters and Zurek [2], which asserts that it is impossible for Eve to generate 
a precise copy of the unknown photonic information being sent from Alice to Bob 
without destroying said information. 
 
The situation changes drastically if Alice does not send single photon states, but 
sometimes sends pulses containing two or more photons. Since Eve can now split the 
photons without destroying the information encoded in the initial state, the security is no 
longer protected by laws of quantum mechanics. This fact was acknowledged by the 
fathers of quantum cryptography [3] and has spurred long-lasting discussions on practical 
QKD security in the research community [4-10]. 
 
In most of the experimental realizations of the BB84 protocol weak coherent 
states (attenuated laser pulses) are used as the light source thus making a certain amount 
of multiphoton pulses available for Eve.  There is a trade off in the pulse intensity 
between security (low mean photon number) and key generation rate (large mean photon 
number).  But even when using so-called “true” single-photon sources, such as those 
based on a heralded single photon source (HSPS) using parametric downconversion 
(PDC) [11] or single photon emitters such as quantum dots [12] and diamond color 
centers [13], any practical device will produce multiple photon pulses with some non-
zero probability.  If the channel loss between Alice and Bob is relatively small, then 
Eve’s attack on multiple photon pulses can be easily rejected by lowering the mean 
photon number and re-examining the privacy amplification model. The presence of 
multiple photons will result in information leakage, but this leakage can be leveraged. 
The presence of single photons gives enough protection to distill an unconditionally 
secure key. A simple rule of thumb is: Alice and Bob must ensure that a certain amount 
of clicks at Bob’s side result from single photon pulses sent by Alice. 
 
If in turn the channel loss is high, and this is the most interesting situation from a 
practical point of view, in addition to photon splitting, Eve can take advantage of the 
channel loss by promoting the quantum states originating from the initial pulses 
containing two and more photons and suppressing the original single photon pulses [5].  
We refer to this attack as the photon number splitting (PNS) attack with blocking and 
boosting. Lowering the mean photon number per pulse is no longer a good strategy for 
Alice and Bob since: 1) the key generation rate will be significantly reduced and 2) Bob’s 
detector noise may increase the quantum bit error rate up to the level where secure key 
distillation is no longer possible.  Let us stress again that the crucial component of the 
PNS attack is Eve’s ability to use a loss-free channel to boost the channel transmittivity 
for the quantum states that she can efficiently eavesdrop, while blocking the single 
photon pulses. 
 
To protect against a PNS attack and maximize both the key generation rates and 
the possible distance over which BB84 can be used, we must supplement the standard 
protocol with additional security measures to protect the key.  One such method is the 
introduction of “decoy states” into the channel, which are used to detect an eavesdropper 
attempting to implement a block and boost PNS attack[14-18].  In the original decoy state 
method by Hwang, the decoys are weak coherent pulses which are equivalent to the 
pulses used to send the key in all aspects except the mean number of photons.  Since Eve 
can not distinguish between decoy pulses and real QKD pulses, she attacks all pulses; 
Alice and Bob can then identify a PNS attack by comparing the gain and quantum bit 
error rate (QBER) for the different subsets of decoy states.  Note that the Ekert protocol 
is immune to the PNS attack since Bell’s inequality is sensitive to the presence of 
additional photon pairs [19-22]. For this reason utilizing remote state preparation [23, 24] 
(sometimes referred to as passive state preparation [25]) does not require decoys to 
identify an eavesdropper because performing a Bell’s inequality test can reveal a PNS 
attack.   
 
In the same way that single photon states can be conditionally prepared from 
PDC, higher order number states can also be prepared [26-28].  This requires the use of 
photon-number resolving detectors, which have recently become available [29-32].  Very 
recently the decoy state concept has been adapted to utilize multiphoton states to detect 
an eavesdropper [33, 34].  This manuscript introduces two practical schemes that use 
these multiphoton states as decoys.  The first utilizes a HSPS for both the decoy and key 
distribution pulses.  The second overcomes the speed limitations of the first by using a 
hybrid scheme of weak coherent pulses for key distribution and conditionally prepared 
number states as decoys. 
 
2. Generating photon number states 
In our QKD schemes, Alice and Bob will use decoy states that are one- and two-photon 
number states, which can be prepared by conditional state preparation of PDC with a 
photon-number-resolving detector (PNRD) [26-28].  Alice uses PDC to generate a two-
mode squeezed state, described by: 
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where the two modes are labeled as Alice’s photon (A) and Bob’s photon (B), andλ  is 
the parametric gain of the two-mode squeezed state.  She then detects her mode with a 
PNRD with quantum efficiency aη , which is described by the POVM elements: 
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n is the number of photons in the pulse, and k is the number of photons registered by 
Alice’s PNRD.  This POVM can be written in terms of measurement operators, or Kraus 
operators, as [35] †ˆ ˆˆ k k kM MΠ =  where  
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The simplicity of the relation between the Kraus operators and the POVM elements is 
due to each term of the sum being the form of a projector.  The state of the light after the 
measurement of Alice’s mode is then determined by  
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which gives the photon probability distribution for Bob’s mode conditionally prepared by 
the registering of k photons by Alice’s PNRD: 
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Note that as 1aη →  the probability distribution becomes the delta function ,( | ) n kP n k δ= , 
i.e. Bob is sent exactly the same photon number as Alice measured [36]. The same is true 
when the parametric interaction is kept weak (
2
0λ → ).  The situation when Alice 
detects a single photon is demonstrated in Fig. 1.  If Alice’s detector efficiency is high, 
then she will generate photon number states with high fidelity, even with strong 
parametric gain, as shown in Fig. 1(a).  If aη is low, however, she will need to be cautious 
of how powerful the PDC interaction is and will have to use a low parametric gain to 
ensure that she generates photon number eigenstates with high fidelity.  Fig. 1(b) shows 
the case where the efficiency is low, but the parametric gain has been lowered to ensure 
the conditional state is approximately a photon number state.  The conditionally prepared 
state no longer emulates a photon number state when the parametric gain remains high 
and the efficiency is low, as demonstrated in Fig. 1(c). Qualitatively similar results occur 
when Alice detects two photons ( 2k = ) with her PNRD, except in this case there is no 
chance for a pulse to contain either zero or one. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Possible conditional photon number distributions prepared by Alice as 
determined by Eqn. (6) for different values of Alice’s detector efficiency and the 
parametric gain.  (a) With a high detector efficiency ( 0.8
a
η = ), the parametric gain can 
be large ( 0.5λ = ) and the photon number distribution is close to a photon number state. 
(b) When the detector efficiency is lower ( 0.1
a
η = ), the parametric gain must be 
lowered ( 0.1λ = ) in order to approximate a photon number state well. (c) The photon 
number distribution is very different from a photon number state when the efficiency is 
low ( 0.1
a
η = ) and the parametric gain is large ( 0.5λ = ).  Note that for all situations 
there is no chance the conditionally prepared state contains zero photons. 
 3. Fock state transmittivity estimation 
The state that Alice sends is, in general, a statistical mixture of Fock states: 
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where ( )Ap n is the probability that Alice emits an n photon state.  We will define the 
transmittivity of a pulse sent by Alice as the probability that the pulse contains at least 
one photon when it arrives at Bob.   Accordingly, each number state has a different 
transmittivity ( )nη  equal to the probability that all the photons in the pulse are not lost: 
 ( ) 1 (1 ) ,n ncη η= − −  (8) 
 
where the channel efficiency cη  is defined as the probability that a single photon arrives 
at Bob given that Alice emitted a single photon pulse.  The one- and two-photon states 
that will be used to estimate the channel loss have transmittivities 
 (1) (2) 2and 2 (1 ) 2c c c c cη η η η η η η= = + − ≈  (9) 
where the approximation is valid for high channel loss ( 1cη << ).   
 
If Bob also used a PNRD they could overcome an eavesdropper by other methods 
[37].   However, we will assume that Bob is restricted to using binary detectors, such as 
avalanche photodiodes operated in Geiger-mode, which only detect the presence or 
absence of light and cannot resolve photon number.  Such detectors will be called single-
photon detectors (SPD).  Alice knows when she has conditionally prepared one or two 
photons with her PNRD.  Bob will, using classical communication, announce to Alice for 
which pulses he detected a click with his SPD.   After a sufficient amount of data has 
been taken, Alice can use Bob’s clicking rates to estimate the channel efficiency cη from 
the transmittivities ( )kη .  She will have two different estimates: one based on when she 
detected one photon and the other from when she detected two photons. 
 
If the estimates of cη  give the same result, then it is safe to assume that no PNS 
attack is being performed by Eve.  If a PNS attack were being used, the transmittivities 
for one and two photons would give different results for the channel efficiency.  Recall 
that the PNS attack requires Eve to suppress the single photon pulses and “promote” the 
transmittivity of the two photon pulses in order for her attack to work.  When she 
observes a two photon state, she splits off one of the photons for herself (which she will 
store in her quantum memory and measure later) and sends the other through a lossless 
channel to Bob.  Therefore, for a typical PNS attack, the single photon suppression will 
be high 1(1 1)κ− ≈ , where 1κ  is the single photon transmittivity when Eve is performing 
an attack, and the two photon suppression will be low 2( 1)κ ≈ , where 2κ  is the two 
photon transmittivity when Eve is attacking.  Since 1 2κ κ<<  the transmittivities that 
Alice and Bob observe will obey the relation (1) (2)η η<< .  Whereas, if the suppression is 
being caused by large channel loss the transmittivities obey the relation (2) (1)2η η= . 
 
4. Possible QKD implementations 
There are several possibilities for how this technique may be used in QKD.  We present 
two of them here. 
 
4.1. QKD with conditionally prepared PDC 
Most implementations of QKD utilize weak coherent pulses (WCP), which have photon 
number distributions that obey the Poisson distribution, because they are easily generated 
by attenuating a laser pulse.  However, one can minimize the possibility of eavesdropping 
(minimize multiphoton content) and increase the key distribution rate (decrease the 
vacuum contribution) by using a HSPS.  In the basic BB84 protocol without decoy states, 
if Alice knew which pulses had multiple photons, as she does in the case where she has a 
PNRD, these pulses would be blocked or simply labeled as unusable for sifting the secure 
key [36].  Using the decoy state method these pulses can be utilized to detect the presence 
of an eavesdropper.  This idea was proposed recently as a passive method of performing 
decoy state QKD [33] with a HSPS. 
 
The basic scheme is shown in Fig. 2. We ignore how the information is encoded 
in the state preparation stage: the physical qubit could be encoded in polarization or 
timing.  Alice pumps PDC in a nonlinear crystal (NLC) with her laser and detects her 
mode with a PNRD.  Each time Alice detects light with her PNRD, she electronically 
tags the pulse with the number of photons.  After Bob’s detection stage, which uses SPDs 
he will send Alice information about which pulses he detected.  From this Alice can look 
for an eavesdropper as discussed above.  The timing information is managed via 
synchronization laser (Sync) and classical communication for error correction and 
privacy amplification occurs between the control units.  The different signals can be 
managed, for example, by wavelength division multiplexers (WDMs) on both sides.   
 
This scheme has several advantages over original decoy state QKD.  First, it 
utilizes a HSPS instead of WCP for distributing the key.  This allows Alice and Bob to 
know exactly which pulses have single photons and thus which can be used  to distill the 
key.  Second, the decoy state encoding is passive.  Whereas the original decoy state 
protocol requires well-calibrated intensity modulators to generate pulses with different 
mean photon number, the different decoy states in this scheme are prepared passively by 
measuring the conjugate arm of PDC with a PNRD, which does not need to be precisely 
calibrated to prepare different photon number states.  Also, the original protocol requires 
Bob to have a well-calibrated SPD; with our method Bob’s detector does not significantly 
affect the one- and two-photon transmittivity estimates. 
 
There is one major disadvantage to this technique: low pulse repetition rates, or 
clock rates.  Due to the nature of the HSPS, the clock rate is limited by the deadtime and 
jitter of Alice’s detector.  For commercial SPDs, the dead-time is approximately 50ns and 
the jitter as low as 300ps, but for PNRD the dead-time is often much larger and is on the 
order of microseconds [30, 38].  Even with a 50ns dead-time, the clock rate is limited to 
20MHz.  On the other hand, QKD schemes that use WCP have been experimentally 
demonstrated with clock rates up to 10GHz [39] – nearly three orders of magnitude  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The schematic of the QKD setup using HSPS with multiphoton decoy states.  
Alice conditionally prepares PDC with a PNRD and encodes the key information onto the 
mode sent to Bob in the state preparation stage.  A sync laser is used to send timing 
information to Bob.  Classical communication also occurs between Alice and Bob’s 
control units.  The different signals are managed with a WDM on both sides.  Bob 
performs a basis choice and detects the light with an SPD.  The timing information is 
measured with a sync detector.  
 
 
 
faster.  In the following section we describe a method to get the best of both schemes: fast 
clock rates with photon number decoy states.   
 
4.2. Fast QKD with number state decoys 
The schematic of the setup is shown in Fig. 3.  Due to the nature of having to combine 
two different sources, there are many intricacies that must be cared for in order to ensure 
secure QKD.  The actual key distribution is done with WCP in order to ensure high clock 
rates.  We use conditionally prepared PDC to generate photon number states which are 
used to detect an eavesdropper.  Alice decides whether to send a WCP or a decoy from 
PDC using an electro-optic switch (switch 3).  Since we are using different sources for 
the decoy states and the WCP, we must ensure that the two are completely 
indistinguishable in all degrees of freedom so that Eve can not selectively attack the 
WCP.  This is achieved with a calibration step that can be run periodically by Alice 
during QKD. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The setup for fast clock rate QKD using WCP for distributing the key and 
conditionally prepared PDC as decoy states.  Alice can calibrate the two sources by using 
electro-optic switches 1 and 2 to interfere the two fields at a beam splitter (BS) with 
SPDs at the output to measure coincidence counts (&).  Otherwise, she chooses whether 
to send a decoy or a WCP using switch 3.  Based on the interference calibration, she can 
adjust the time delay and spectrum of the WCP so that the two are exactly the same for 
both the decoy pulse and the WCP.  Bob simply makes a random basis choice and detects 
with SPDs.  All classical communication is handled by the control units. 
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 4.2.1. Indistinguishability calibration.  The two crucial degrees of freedom that must be 
indistinguishable in the two sources are timing and spectrum.  The best way to calibrate 
the sources is via interference because a prerequisite for any interference phenomenon is 
that the different possibilities that lead to a given outcome must be indistinguishable [40].  
Since we wish to calibrate two different sources, we will use fourth-order interference in 
the form of a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer (HOMI) [41].  There are two parameters 
we will adjust to maximize interference: the time delay in the HSPS arm and the variable 
spectral filter in the WCP arm.  To switch to calibration mode, Alice uses electro-optic 
switches 1 and 2 to direct the two modes towards the 50/50 BS.  The two-output ports are 
monitored with SPDs and the coincidence counts are measured.  We wish to minimize 
the coincidence counts, because the fourth-order interference causes photon bunching at 
the output of the BS.  Perfect interference (100% visibility) will result in zero 
coincidence counts in the SPDs. 
 
For the moment, let us assume that the two modes are both pure single photon 
wavepackets as described by  
 †( ) ( ) 0i ii d f aψ ω ω ω= ∫ , (10) 
where † ( )ia ω  is the creation operator for a photon in mode i with frequency ω  and 
2
( )if ω  is the spectrum of the single photon.  Then the normalized coincidence rate of 
the detectors cR , assuming Gaussian spectral amplitudes ( )if ω , is [42] 
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where t is the difference in time when the two photons interact with the BS, iσ  is the 
bandwidth of the ith field, and iω  is the central frequency of the ith field.  The visibility is 
defined as 
 
max( ) min( )
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and is clearly maximum when 0t = , 1 2ω ω= , and 1 2σ σ= .  Therefore, during the 
calibration, Alice will adjust the time-delay and spectrum to minimize the coincidence 
counts and maximize the visibility.  For example, assuming the central frequencies of the 
two spectra have already been equalized, the visibility as a function of the ratio of 
bandwidths 1 2/s σ σ= , as determined by Eqn. (11) and Eqn. (12) is 
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+
, (13) 
which is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
In order to perform this calibration, it was assumed that each field was a pure 
single photon state.  There are a couple of subtleties that need to be addressed in order to 
ensure successful calibration.  One of the fields used is a WCP, which is not a single 
photon, but by maintaining a low mean photon number the visibility can be kept  
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Figure 4.  The visibility (V) of the HOMI (assuming equal central frequencies) as a 
function of the ratio between the two different bandwidths (s).   
 
 
high [43].  The nice feature of this calibration is that even if the visibility decreases, the 
maximum is still located at the same place in parameter space; therefore as long as the 
visibility is maximized, Alice knows she has her parameters optimized. 
 
A second, more crucial subtlety is the assumption of purity.  In order for the two 
fields to interfere, each photon wavepacket must be a superposition of all the different 
frequencies, not a statistical mixture.  If they were statistical mixtures, we would be 
attempting to interfere a photon with one spectrum with a second that most likely has a 
different spectrum; this would reduce the visibility significantly.  In general, most 
conditionally prepared PDC sources create mixed states due to the frequency 
entanglement that exists between the two photons.  However, by choosing the dispersive 
properties of the nonlinear material properly, one can create a two-mode squeezed state 
that is factorizable in frequency and therefore creates pure single photon wavepackets 
upon detection of one field[44-47].  This spectral engineering is of utmost importance for 
this QKD protocol as well as all quantum information protocols that utilize conditionally 
prepared PDC as single photon sources.   
 
4.2.2. Choice of WCP intensity. Once Alice and Bob have collected enough calibration 
data the optimal choice of mean photon number µ  for her WCP can be determined from 
the measurement of one- and two- photon transmittivities.  This is done by defining a 
figure of merit D  to maximize with respect to the mean photon number: 
 (1) ( 1)B BD p p= − > , (14) 
where (1)Bp  is the probability that a pulse sent by Alice containing a single photon still 
contains a single photon when it arrives at Bob and ( 1)Bp >  is the probability that the 
  
Figure 5.  The optimal mean photon number µ  for Alice’s WCP as a function of the 
channel loss 
c
η .  Note that even as the channel efficiency goes to zero, the optimal mean 
photon number remains greater than 0.316. 
 
 
 
 
pulse that originally contained multiple photons is not a vacuum state when it arrives at 
Bob.  This figure of merit is different from the gain that is most commonly maximized 
[48] and maximizes the robustness of Alice and Bob’s QKD rather than the key 
generation rate.  The situation for normal channel loss is shown in Fig. 5.  For perfect 
channel efficiency, Alice can use mean photon number 0.5µ = .  The optimal mean 
photon number decreases as the channel efficiency decreases, but it does not tend towards 
zero; rather, it stays above 0.316 for all possible loss values.  This is essentially the same 
scenario as if Alice were doing a simple PNS attack without blocking single photons and 
boosting multiple photons. 
 
The situation is different when Eve is performing a PNS attack with blocking and 
boosting.  As stated above, the key to the attack is boosting the multiphoton transmittivity 
mκ  while suppressing that of a single photon 1κ .  Fig. 6 shows the optimal mean photon 
number’s dependence on the ratio 1 / mκ κ  based on the same figure of merit as above.  
The parameter regime for an effective PNS attack is 1 2κ κ<< , resulting in a small ratio of 
transmittivities.  This requires Alice to use a very low mean photon number for her WCP.  
However, if it is found that there is no PNS attack but there is simply loss (i.e. the 
parameters lie on the bold line), the mean photon number of the WCP can be much 
higher.   
 
Figure 6.  The optimal mean photon number is determined by the details of Eve’s PNS 
attack, which is characterized by the single photon transmittivity 
1
κ  and the multiphoton 
transmittivity 
m
κ .  The effective regime for a PNS attack is a small value for the ratio of 
these two numbers. 
 
 
Fig. 5 is approximately incorporated in Fig. 6 because the ratio 11 2/ (2 )cκ κ η
−= − , 
which ranges between 0.5 and 1 for 0cη =  and 1cη = , respectively.  The reason the 
correspondence is approximate is that for the PNS attack, we assumed that the 
multiphoton transmittivity is the same for all photon numbers greater than one because 
Eve selectively boosts the transmittivity of these pulses.  In the case of loss, the 
transmittivity is not the same for all higher photon numbers.  Note that an effective PNS 
attack with blocking and boosting can never be confused with loss because the ratio of 
transmittivities can never be lower than 0.5 when it is caused by channel loss. 
 
5. Summary 
In conclusion, we have investigated the technique of using photon number transmittivities 
as a method of detecting multiphoton attacks on QKD.  Two different QKD protocols 
based on BB84 with multiphoton decoy states were discussed as examples of this 
method.  Though the limits on the protocols’ performances were not discussed in detail, 
the analysis is very similar to that presented in [33].  The second of these protocols 
allowed the use of fast clock rates by using WCP for key distribution while using 
conditionally prepared photon number to detect an eavesdropper.  Also, the ability to 
monitor the one- and two-photon transmittivities allows Alice to choose the optimal mean 
photon number for her WCP such that she minimizes Eve’s information. 
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